Supreme Court of New York, New York County - People v. Molina by Shupak, Brian
Touro Law Review 
Volume 26 
Number 3 Annual New York State Constitutional 
Issue 
Article 23 
July 2012 
Supreme Court of New York, New York County - People v. Molina 
Brian Shupak 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Shupak, Brian (2012) "Supreme Court of New York, New York County - People v. Molina ," Touro Law 
Review: Vol. 26 : No. 3 , Article 23. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss3/23 
This Equal Protection is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. 
For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK,
NEW YORK COUNTY
People v. Molina'
(decided June 29, 2009)
On January 29, 2009, a jury convicted Jose Molina "of Reck-
less Driving2 and Driving While Ability Impaired by Alcohol." 3 Fol-
lowing his conviction, Molina moved to set aside the verdict4 arguing
that his equal protection and due process rights guaranteed by both
federal5 and state6 constitutions were violated when the New York
City Police Department ("NYPD"), pursuant to a departmental poli-
cy, failed to provide him with a physical coordination test because he
did not understand the English language.' Ultimately, the court
granted his motion and dismissed the charges, finding that the NYPD
procedure violated his constitutional rights.
' 887 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2009).
2 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1212 (McKinney 1988) provides, in pertinent part: "Reckless
driving shall mean driving . . . in a manner which unreasonably interferes with the free and
proper use of the public highway, or unreasonably endangers users of the public highway."
3 Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 787. See also N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192 (1) (McKinney
2009) ("No person shall operate a motor vehicle while the person's ability to operate such
motor vehicle is impaired by. . . alcohol.").
4 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.30 (1) (McKinney 1970) provides, in pertinent part:
At any time after rendition of a verdict of guilty and before sentence, the
court may, upon motion of the defendant, set aside or modify the verdict
or any part thereof upon .. . [a]ny ground appearing in the record which,
if raised upon an appeal from a prospective judgment of conviction,
would require a reversal or modification of the judgment as a matter of
law by an appellate court.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, states, in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to ny person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
6 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11, states, in pertinent part: "No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof."; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6,
states, in pertinent part: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law."
Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
Id. at 797.
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Shortly before ten o'clock on the night of December 2, 2007,
police officer Edward Aiken was patrolling the Bronx-Whitestone
Bridge toll plaza when he observed Molina driving erratically from
E-Z Pass lane eleven to nine.9 Aiken became suspicious and walked
over to lane nine, stood in front of Molina's car, put his hand out, and
signaled for him to stop.'o
During the course of the traffic stop, Aiken asked Molina a
few questions," noticed his bloodshot eyes, and detected a strong
odor of alcohol on his breath.12 Although Molina responded to Ai-
ken's questions, Aiken could not determine whether his speech was
slurred because of Molina's heavy Spanish accent.' 3 Aiken ordered
Molina out of the vehicle so that he could conduct "a field sobriety
coordination test."' 4 However, Aiken did not administer the test in
the interest of Molina's safety because he "was unsteady on his
feet."' 5 Molina was then arrested and transported to the police sta-
tion.16 At the police station, police officer Michael Sharpe adminis-
tered a Breathalyzer test to Molina after he explained the procedure
in English.17 However, Sharpe did not administer a physical coordi-
nation test because of a "language barrier."' 8
At Molina's trial the government called Aiken and Sharpe as
witnesses.19 Aiken testified to the events that occurred at the toll-
booth plaza, 20 while Sharpe "unequivocally testified that when en-
countering a Spanish speaking suspect he has never administered the
physical coordination test due to language barriers." 2' Molina was
9 Id. at 787.
10 Id.
" Officer Aiken asked Molina if he was okay, to which he did not respond. Id. He also
asked him if he had been drinking, to which he initially responded no, but when asked again,
he said he had consumed three beers. Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
12 id.
13 Id.
14 This is a series of tests "consist[ing] of horizontal gaze and nystagmus which involves
the defendant following an object with his eyes. One leg stand and counting to a prescribed
number, and heel to toe walking back and forth." Id. at 788 n.2.
" Id. at 788.
16 Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
" Id. at 788.
1 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
" Id. at 787.
20 See id. at 787-88.
21 Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 788 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 26980
2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 26 [2010], No. 3, Art. 23
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss3/23
EQUAL PROTECTION
then convicted on two charges,22 and he subsequently filed a post-
trial motion to set aside the verdict on the grounds that his conviction
violated his equal protection and due process rights under the United
States Constitution23 and the New York Constitution.24 More specifi-
cally, Molina argued that his rights were violated because "the police
department[] fail[ed] to administer a physical coordination test . . .
because [he] spoke Spanish." 25 In opposition, the government argued
that the purpose in not administering the test was to "avoid[] confu-
sion and complications due to any language barrier, as the police
simply do not administer field sobriety tests to non-English speaking
defendants."26
On the issue of equal protection, the court recognized that
section 1192 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law ("VTL") is not discrimi-
natory on its face, but that the NYPD's enforcement of the statute
created a discriminatory result.27 When challenging a law on equal
protection grounds, a court must first determine what level of scruti-
ny to apply.28
The trial court record revealed that the NYPD employed a
procedure of providing two videotaped tests in English, but only one
videotaped test in Spanish. 29 The court determined that this proce-
dure is not rationally related to the purpose of avoiding confusion or
complications. In addition, although Molina is of Hispanic origin
22 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1212; N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192 (1).
23 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, states, in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
24 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11, states, in pertinent part: "No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof."; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6,
states, in pertinent part: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law."
25 Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 788 (internal quotations omitted).
26 Id. at 789 (internal quotations omitted).
27 Id. at 794.
28 Id. at 793. Strict scrutiny is applied "where governmental action disadvantages a sus-
pect class or burdens a fundamental right." Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 41 (2d
Cir. 1983). Such classification "will be upheld only if the government can establish a com-
pelling justification for the action." Id However, "where a suspect class or a fundamental
right is not implicated, the challenged action need only be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose." Id.
29 Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
30 id
2010] 981
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and speaks with a heavy accent, he still "speaks and understands Eng-
lish."3  Furthermore, Sharpe's testimony that there was a language
barrier was flawed; the videotaped procedure at the police station
showed a controlled environment with no indication of confusion or
complications.32 Based on these facts the court concluded that this
was a clear case of discrimination against a man of Hispanic origin,
"because of an alleged language barrier and not because of a desire to
avoid confusion and/or complications." 33
In reaching its conclusion, the court applied strict scrutiny and
held that the NYPD's enforcement of section 1192 of the VTL vi-
olated the Equal Protection Clause.34 The enforcement of section
1192 by the NYPD discriminated against Spanish-speaking individu-
als because it created a classification based on national origin and the
"inability to speak and/or understand . . . English."35 Furthermore,
when classifications like this occur, the police must make reasonable
efforts to ensure that Spanish-speaking defendant's rights are pro-
tected in the same manner as English speakers' rights are protected.36
Despite Molina's ability to speak and understand English,
Sharpe still denied him the opportunity to take a physical coordina-
tion test. 37 Also, Sharpe did not take reasonable steps to protect Mo-
lina's rights; he made no attempt to locate a translator or anyone who
could have communicated with Molina, and he failed to show an ex-
planatory videotape in Spanish. The court made clear that the
NYPD's procedure "has no compelling justification for its applica-
tion[,] and is inherently discriminatory against non-English speaking
individuals of Hispanic origin and ethnicity." 39 Furthermore, if both
the chemical breath and physical coordination tests were provided,
there would not have been any issue of a language barrier; no barrier
31 Id.
32 id.
33 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
34 Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
3 Id. at 794.
36 Id. See also People v. Niedzwiecki, 487 N.Y.S.2d 694, 696 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1985)
("[The defendant] must reach a threshold point of understanding the choice presented to him,
so he may at least be able to make a decision as to the course of conduct he will take.").
" Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 794-95.
38 Id. at 795.
39 Id.
982 [Vol. 26
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existed because Molina spoke English despite a heavy accent. Even
if there was an issue of a language barrier, the police could have
asked anyone who spoke Spanish to explain the procedure to Molina,
which would have effectively eliminated any discrimination.40
Next, the court turned to Molina's due process claim. Al-
though the New York standard was briefly mentioned,41 the court fol-
lowed the United States Supreme Court's three-part test.42 The court
stated that the private interests affected by the discriminatory proce-
dure include Molina's guilt or innocence, his driving privileges, loss
of liberty, financial interests, and reputation in the community or at
work.43 There is a high risk of a wrongful deprivation of these inter-
ests through the procedures used, which include possible incarcera-
tion, fines, and loss of driving privileges.44 These risks could have
been avoided if the NYPD implemented alternative procedures for
non-English speaking defendants. 45  Although the government has a
paramount interest in highway safety, the NYPD's procedure did not
advance that interest.46 The use of an interpreter to explain the physi-
cal coordination test better serves both parties, and is not an insur-
mountable burden "when weighed against the defendant's right to a
fair trial, [his] opportunity to defend against the state's accusations,
and [his] access to potentially exculpatory evidence." 47
40 Id. at 795.
41 See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. See also People v. Torres, 772 N.Y.S.2d 125, 126 (App.
Div. 3d Dep't 2004) (" 'It is a well-established precept of due process that non-English
speaking defendants in criminal actions are entitled to an interpreter.' " (quoting People v.
Rodriguez, 633 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1995))); Yellen v. Baez, 676
N.Y.S.2d 724, 725 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. City 1997) (noting that due process requires an interpreta-
tion of judicial proceedings when a defendant does not understand English).
42 Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 795-97. In Mathews v. Eldridge, the United States Supreme
Court articulated a three-part test to evaluate due process claims:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, in-
cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
43 Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
4Id
45 id.
4 Id. at 797.
47 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
2010] 983
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After evaluating Molina's claim, it was clear that the NYPD
procedure violated his equal protection and due process rights be-
cause it discriminated against a Spanish-speaking defendant on the
basis of national origin and ethnicity. The police procedure failed
strict scrutiny and violated Molina's right to due process. Therefore,
the court set aside Molina's conviction and dismissed the charges
against him.4 8
The United States Constitution guarantees to its citizens that
states cannot deprive them of the equal protection of the laws.49  It
protects against discrimination that occurs in the express terms of a
statute or in the statute's execution.50 A statute may be nondiscrimi-
natory on its face, yet when executed it may produce a grossly dis-
criminatory result.51 The threshold question is "whether the State has
invidiously denied one class of defendants a substantial benefit avail-
able to another class of defendants." 52
In analyzing the principal question, courts must be cognizant
of the standard of review on an equal protection challenge. Strict
scrutiny is appropriate when a suspect class is disadvantaged or
where a fundamental right is burdened by governmental action.53
There is also intermediate scrutiny, where a law will be upheld if it is
substantially related to an important governmental purpose.5 4 Inter-
mediate scrutiny is appropriate when the classification is based on
gender.55 Rational basis scrutiny is the lowest standard, and govern-
48 Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
49 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
50 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). See also Sioux City Bridge
Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923) (" 'The purpose of the equal protection
clause . . . is to secure every person within the state's jurisdiction against intentional and ar-
bitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper
execution through duly constituted agents.' " (quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield
Twp., 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918))). See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879)
(invalidating state law limiting jury service to white men).
s' Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 n.11 (1956).
52 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983).
s3 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993). See also Soberal-Perez, 717 F.2d at 41
(noting that strict scrutiny requires the government to show a compelling state interest).
54 See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (invalidating a New York
law that allowed unmarried mothers but not unmarried fathers to veto adoption of a child by
withholding consent); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (invalidating Oklahoma law
that prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" beer to males under the age of twenty-one and
females under the age of eighteen).
ss Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
[Vol. 26984
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ment action will be upheld "if there is a rational relationship between
the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental pur-
pose."56
The New York Constitution and a subsequent Civil Rights
Law passed by the New York State Legislature ("Legislature") have
been interpreted to approach equal protection claims slightly different
than the United States Constitution.5 7 The New York Court of Ap-
peals has stated that the issue is determined by "the similarity or dis-
similarity of rights differentiated by a statute; and the reasonableness
of classification when different methods are used to affect different
classes."5 Reasonable efforts must be made to protect a person's
rights when a statute is discriminatory, especially when there is a lack
of understanding of English. 59 A person must understand the choices
presented to make an informed decision of how to proceed, especially
when their decision can result in prima facie evidence for criminal
proceedings.60
The same constitutional issue that was presented in Molina
was raised in People v. Garcia-Cepero.6 1 In that case a police officer
pulled Garcia-Cepero over after he observed him driving erratically. 62
When the officer approached the vehicle to speak with Garcia-
Cepero, there was a strong alcoholic smell on his breath, his eyes
were bloodshot, and when he got out of the car he "was unsteady on
his feet." 63 Garcia-Cepero slurred his speech and made a statement in
Spanish to the officer that did not have a literal translation.64 After
the officer determined that Garcia-Cepero was intoxicated, he placed
him under arrest and transported him to the police station.6' At the
56 Heller, 509 U.S. at 320.
s7 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. See also N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 40-c (2) (McKinney 2003)
("No person shall, because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, marital status, sexual
orientation or disability . . . be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil
rights ..... ).
58 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 261 N.E.2d 647, 653 (N.Y. 1970).
5 See Niedzwiecki, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
60 id
61 See 874 N.Y.S.2d 689, 692 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 2008).
62 Id. at 691.
63 Id.
64 Id. Garcia-Cepero uttered the phrase "un pequetas," which "has no Spanish transla-
tion." Id. at 691 n.1 (internal quotations omitted).
65 Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
2010] 985
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police station Garcia-Cepero was shown a video in Spanish explain-
ing the procedure for a chemical breath test and the consequences of
refusal.66  In response to whether Garcia-Cepero consented to a
chemical breath test, he replied "no drogas, no drogas," which, when
translated into English, means "no drugs, no drugs."67 The officers in
the station understood his response as a refusal to submit to the chem-
ical breath test.68 At no time while he was in police custody did Gar-
cia-Cepero take or have the opportunity to take a physical coordina-
tion test.69
In evaluating Garcia-Cepero's equal protection claim, the Su-
preme Court, Bronx County, followed the standard established by the
New York Court of Appeals in 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay.70 The
court found that the NYPD procedure "creates a classification predi-
cated upon a person's ability to speak and understand . . . English[,]
... and therefore discriminates against non-English speaking individ-
uals."7  Therefore, the police were required to make reasonable ef-
forts to protect Garcia-Cepero's rights.72 However, the police failed
to make any effort to locate a translator to assist Garcia-Cepero and,
as a result, the police procedure "differentiates between two classes,"
has no rational basis, "and is inherently discriminatory." 73
The court suggested that the use of a translator could have
remedied the discriminatory procedure.74 More significantly, the
court recognized that the physical coordination test administered to
English speakers "is never presented to non-English speaking defen-
dants."75 Based on this, the most troubling result is that a non-
English speaking defendant is denied any opportunity to present
66 Id.
67 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
68 Id.
69 Id.
7o Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 695. See also 8200 Realty Corp., 261 N.E.2d at 653
("The question of equal protection turns ultimately on the similarity or dissimilarity of rights
differentiated by a statute and the reasonableness of classification when different methods
are used to affect different classes.").
71 Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
72 Id. ("[W]hen a person does not speak or understand English, extra efforts must be made
to insure that person's rights are protected the same as English speaking defendants.").
7 Id. at 695-96.
74 Id. at 696.
75 id.
986 [Vol. 26
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possible exculpatory evidence at trial.76 In drunk driving cases, the
most relevant evidence to the defendant's guilt or innocence is the
chemical breath test and physical coordination test results.77 Exclud-
ing this evidence on the basis that the defendant does not understand
English is inherently discriminatory and clearly violates the Equal
Protection Clause.78
The same NYPD procedure was challenged again in People v
Burnet.79 In that case Burnet was pulled over for being suspected of
driving under the influence of alcohol.80  He was subsequently ar-
rested and taken to the police station where he watched a video in
Spanish, which provided him with the opportunity to take a chemical
breath test.8 '
At the suppression hearing, Burnet argued that his equal pro-
tection and due process rights were violated because the NYPD did
not provide him with an interpreter during the chemical test to ex-
plain the procedure and the consequences of refusing.82 He further
argued that providing an English-speaking individual both a chemical
breath test and a physical coordination test, while only providing the
chemical test to non-English speaking defendants, creates a disparate
practice and is subject to strict scrutiny. 8 3
The Burnet court disagreed and noted that neither the United
States Constitution nor the New York Constitution recognizes non-
English speaking individuals as a suspect class; therefore, strict scru-
tiny is not applicable. 84 In making this determination, the court rec-
ognized that Burnet did not make the requisite showing that non-
English speaking individuals, as a class, have been discriminated
against because of race, nationality, or ethnicity.85 The only evidence
76 Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 696 ("In many cases, this evidence is crucial in deter-
mining ... guilt or innocence. Unfortunately, these tests are automatically excluded for non-
English speaking defendants for reasons that do not show impracticability or impossibili-
ty.").
77 Id.
78 Id.
7 882 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 2009).
so Id. at 839.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 842.
83 Id.
8 Burnet, 882 N.Y.S.2d at 842-43.
85 Id. at 843.
2010] 987
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he offered was that non-English speaking defendants are denied the
opportunity to take a physical coordination test "to avoid confusion
and complications due to any language barrier." 86 Under rational ba-
sis scrutiny, the court concluded that the NYPD's procedure of fore-
going the physical coordination test is rationally related to the pur-
pose of avoiding confusion.
Molina also challenged his conviction under the Due Process
Clause of both the United States Constitution and New York Consti-
tution. The United States Supreme Court has stated that a due
process claim is judged on a case-by-case inquiry, 89 because due
process " 'is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated
to time, place and circumstances.' "90 As a result, the Court has uti-
lized a three-part test when considering due process inquiries:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depri-
vation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Govern-
ment's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the addition-
al or substitute procedural requirement would entail.9'
It is well established that New York courts protect a non-
English speaking defendant's due process rights by affording an in-
terpreter at judicial proceedings in order for the defendant to under-
stand and participate in his defense. 92 Although the right to an inter-
preter is not found in the United States Constitution or New York
86 id.
87 Id.
88 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, states, in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..... ; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6,
states, in pertinent part: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law."
89 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334.
9 Id. (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
' Id. at 335.
92 People v. Ramos (Ramos 11), 258 N.E.2d 197, 198 (N.Y. 1970). See also Torres, 772
N.Y.S.2d at 126 (" 'It is a well-established precept of due process that non-English speaking
defendants in criminal actions are entitled to an interpreter.' " (quoting Rodriguez, 633
N.Y.S.2d at 681))).
988 [Vol. 26
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Constitution, the failure to provide one when needed violates a de-
fendant's right to due process. In fact, there is statutory authority
that describes the procedure for appointing interpreters during court
proceedings, which was enacted to "protect fundamental rights and
facilitate access to the legal process."94 However, the statutory re-
quirement for appointing interpreters only extends to judicial pro-
ceedings.95
At his Mapp hearing96 Garcia-Cepero similarly argued that
the NYPD procedure violated his due process rights. In evaluating
his claim, the court focused solely on the United States Supreme
Court's three-part test from Mathews.98 As to the first part of the
test-the private interest affected by the official action-Garcia-
Cepero's guilt or innocence and driving privileges were clearly af-
fected by the discriminatory police procedure. 99
With regard to the second part of the test, Garcia-Cepero was
charged with Driving While Intoxicatedo00 and, because he refused
the chemical breath test, there were possible consequences under
another statute.101 He could have been imprisoned for up to one year,
93 Yellen, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 725-26 ("It is a fundamental axiom of our system of jurispru-
dence that due process of law includes the right to have an adequate interpretation of the
proceedings.").
94 Id. at 726. See also N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 386 (McKinney 2009) ("The county judge
and the district attorney of the county may appoint one interpreter, who shall act as . . . the
court interpreter for such county."). The burden is on the party that needs an interpreter to
notify the court that he/she does not understand the proceedings. See People v. Ramos (Ra-
mos 1), 269 N.Y.S.2d 309, 310 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1966). The party should either make a
complaint to the court or notify represented counsel for the need of an interpreter. Id The
failure to make such a notification when the defendant is able to will not overturn an unfa-
vorable verdict against him on appeal. Id
9 Ramos II, 258 N.E.2d at 198 ("[A] defendant who cannot understand English is entitled
to have the trial testimony interpreted to him in a language which he understands."); Torres,
772 N.Y.S.2d at 126. See also Burnet, 882 N.Y.S.2d at 843 ("[T]his court is unaware of any
federal or state constitutional right to have interpretation services in . . . extra-judicial pro-
ceedings, . . . [but] the failure to provide a qualified interpreter in court proceedings would
indeed be a denial of due process of the law.").
96 The court held a Mapp hearing to decide whether there was probable cause for the traf-
fic stop and arrest, and whether Garcia-Cepero refused the breathalyzer. Garcia-Cepero,
874 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
9 Id. at 692.
9' Id. at 696-97.
99 Id. at 697.
1n N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192 (1), (3).
101 Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.3d at 697. See generally N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1193
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subjected to fines of up to five hundred dollars, and had his driving
privileges suspended. 10 2 There is a direct relationship between being
deprived of his interests and the privileges to drive, and had the po-
lice implemented "additional or substitute procedures" it could have
avoided the "deprivation of such interests."1 03
Finally, as to the third part-the government's interest-the
NYPD's procedure does anything but "insure that the ends of justice
are served-that the guilty be punished and the innocent be set
free."l 04 The use of an interpreter would avoid these due process
concerns; if an interpreter were provided, the defendant would clearly
understand the procedure and could make an informed decision on
how to proceed. 0 5 The court concluded by noting that securing an
interpreter for the defendant is not an insurmountable burden, espe-
cially when weighed against the fundamental right to a fair trial, to
defend against accusations, and to present exculpatory evidence.106
In Burnet, the court rejected the defendant's due process
claim.107 The court made no reference to Mathews, but instead found
that Burnet's due process claim failed under the New York stan-
dard.108 Although there is a right to an interpreter at judicial proceed-
ings, this right does not extend to extrajudicial proceedings.' 09 Un-
like court proceedings, which are clearly judicial, the chemical test
phase is an administrative extrajudicial proceeding and is not consi-
dered part of a criminal judicial proceeding. 0 Thus, the right to an
interpreter is not fundamental during this phase and the absence of an
interpreter does not violate due process."'
In light of the inconsistent equal protection decisions in Gar-
cia-Cepero and Burnet, Molina appears to be a step in the right direc-
tion for courts providing equal protection of the laws to non-English
(1) (b) (McKinney 2009).
102 Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.3d at 697.
103 Id.
10 Id.
105 Id.
10' Id. at 698.
t0 Burnet, 882 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
"' Id.
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speaking defendants. Garcia-Cepero and Burnet were each decided
on two different standards; Garcia-Cepero affords more protection
under the New York Constitution than Burnet does under the United
States Constitution.1 2 Molina indicates that Burnet's decision on the
question of equal protection was due to a lack of evidence, whereas
in Molina there was evidence that the so-called language barrier and
concern for "confusion and/or complications" did not exist."' Moli-
na is important because it represents a court's willingness to provide
more protection to non-English speaking defendants after Burnet re-
moved that protection. A possible reason is that Molina is part of a
suspect class, a notion that was rejected in Burnet; thus, the Molina
Court applied strict scrutiny rather than rational basis.
But Molina does not stop there; the court also notes that Span-
ish-speaking individuals of Hispanic origin are a suspect class, and
government regulations discriminating against them must be re-
viewed under strict scrutiny.' 14 To reinforce this finding one needs to
look no further than the demographics of New York City which indi-
cate an overwhelming Hispanic population."' 5 Hispanics account for
approximately 27.1% of the population and, in the Bronx alone,
where Garcia-Cepero, Burnet, and Molina were decided, the Hispan-
ic population is over fifty-one percent."16 These statistics clearly de-
pict an overwhelming need for greater equal protection of the laws.
Therefore, the Legislature and the NYPD should develop procedures
112 Compare Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 695 (invalidating the NYPD procedure be-
cause it "creates a classification predicated upon a person's ability to speak and understand
the English language"), with Burnet, 882 N.Y.S.2d at 843 (finding that strict scrutiny is in-
applicable because there is no suspect classification when the police employ different proce-
dures for English and non-English speaking defendants, and therefore, any differentiation is
constitutional if it satisfies rational basis scrutiny).
" Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 793-94. In Burnet the court stated that simply because non-
English speaking individuals are denied a physical coordination test "does not entitle [them]
to strict scrutiny." Burnet, 882 N.Y.S.2d at 843. However, in Molina, the court distin-
guished the finding in Burnet on the ground that the videotaped procedure in the police de-
partment showed a controlled environment with little evidence of confusion because of a
language barrier. Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 794. Based on these facts, the NYPD procedure
resulted in discrimination on the basis of national origin and not on the basis of a desire to
avoid a language barrier; thus the statute failed strict scrutiny. Id.
114 Id. at 794.
"5 See New York City Dep't of City Planning, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/cen-
sus/popacs.shtml (click the "2008" link in the "Hispanic Origin" section of the table to open
up the report) (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
116 Id.
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to protect non-English speakers' rights. Burnet, Garcia-Cepero, and
Molina suggest remedial options to protect a non-English speaker.
The remedial procedure would only require that "reasonable efforts
... be made to ensure that . . . rights are protected.""17 The "thre-
shold point of understanding the choice[s]" is not a high standard at
all." 8 Videotapes in different languages that explain to a non-English
speaker his rights or providing a translator in the police department
are two suggestions that could resolve the issue. These two options
are reasonable efforts that will allow a non-English speaker to under-
stand their choices.
It is interesting that the government in Molina argued that the
NYPD forego the physical coordination test because of a language
barrier, yet that language barrier was non-existent during the video-
taped procedure of the chemical test."' Is it because there is a statu-
tory requirement to offer a chemical breath test and explain the con-
sequences of refusal, and no corresponding requirement for a
physical coordination test? 20  Is it because the explanation of a
chemical breath test and the consequences of refusal in Spanish are
any less confusing than the explanation of a physical coordination
test in Spanish? The latter possibility is not plausible; Molina ex-
plains that the simple instructions of a physical coordination test in
English include "touch your nose with your forefinger[,] ... [w]alk in
a straight line[,] . . . [and] [r]aise your right leg."' 2 1 These simple
phrases cannot be anymore confusing in Spanish than explaining the
chemical test procedure and consequences of refusal in Spanish.122
"7 Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
118 Niedzwiecki, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
"9 See Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
120 See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (2) (a) (1) (McKinney 2006) which states, in perti-
nent part:
Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to
have given consent to a chemical test . .. at the direction of the police of-
ficer having reasonable grounds to believe such person to have been op-
erating in violation of any subdivision of section [1192] of this article
and within two hours after such person has been placed under arrest for
any such violation.
121 Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 797 (internal quotations omitted).
122 Burnet provided excerpts from the notice of charges, requests for the defendant to take
a chemical breath test, and the consequences of refusal to a non-English speaking defendant:
You have been arrested for driving a vehicle under the influence of alco-
hol or drugs. I would like you to take a chemical exam of your breath.
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Garcia-Cepero, Burnet, and Molina all made references to
how the use of interpreters could avoid the discriminatory result, but
after Molina an interpreter is not the only reasonable method to pro-
tect non-English speaking individuals, let alone the most reasonable
method. The NYPD should create videotaped procedures for both
the chemical breath test and physical coordination test for the most
commonly spoken languages. 123 This would be a better attempt at
guaranteeing equal protection than the one that is currently employed.
But how expansive should the collection of videos for different lan-
guages be? As of 2000, there are approximately thirty-eight different
languages spoken in New York: 124 45,767 people speak Tagalog,
19,895 people speak Serbo-Croatian, 25,015 speak Hindi, and 38,489
people speak Urdu.125 These few examples make clear that the use of
interpreters is an issue the NYPD needs to address. Because of this
issue, courts will continue to struggle with the far-reaching implica-
tions of Molina. Unfortunately, the Molina court did not give any in-
dication of going beyond the Hispanic classification it declared was
suspect. Whether people who speak the languages referenced above
will be declared a suspect class remains to be decided by future
courts. There have been efforts to declare English the official lan-
guage of the United States, 126 but this should not obviate the need for
efforts to be made to protect non-English speaking individuals so
long as they are a citizens of the United States. How far will the
courts go in protecting non-English speaking defendants? Right now
Do you want to take the test, yes or no? ... [If you refuse] ... this will
result in the immediate suspension and the subsequent revocation of your
driver's license, or driving privileges, whether or not you are found
guilty of the charges for which you have been arrested. Also, if you
refuse to submit to a chemical test or whatever part of the same, this
could be presented as evidence against you in any trial, proceeding, or
hearing as a result of the arrest.
Burnet, 882 N.Y.S.2d at 839-40.
123 Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 796-97.
124 See Languages Spoken at Home and Ancestry, The Weissman Center for International
Business, Baruch College, http://www.baruch.edu/nycdata/chapter01_files/sheet011.htm
(last visited January 23, 2009) (listing the different languages spoken in New York City and
the population of people who speak it).
125 id.
126 See Sen. Inhofe Introduces English Language Unity Act, U.S. FED. NEWS, May 16,
2009 (discussing the English Language Unity Act of 2009, which would "declare English as
the official language of the United States") (internal quotations omitted).
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it is unknown, but it is certainly an issue that needs to be resolved.
With respect to due process, there are inconsistencies among
Garcia-Cepero, Burnet, and Molina. Garcia-Cepero and Molina fol-
lowed Mathews, while Burnet followed the reasoning of Rodriguez
and Ramos.' 27 There is no dispute that after these three decisions,
Mathews provides greater protection than Rodriguez and Ramos. Ro-
driguez and Ramos focus on aspects of time and location, whereas
Mathews does not consider those factors. This distinction seems at
odds with the Supreme Court's statements that "Due Process, 'unlike
some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances,' "l28 and that "[D]ue
[P]rocess is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands."1 29
The three decisions discussed represent New York's struggle
to determine whether it should follow Rodriguez and Ramos, or Ma-
thews. Because New York has failed to extend the use of an interpre-
ter to extrajudicial proceedings, Rodriguez and Ramos fail to take in-
to account the unique circumstances of a DWI case, where the only
relevant evidence is collected within two hours of the arrest.' 30 Since
the holdings of Rodriguez and Ramos are limited to judicial proceed-
ings and the chemical test procedure is purely administrative, non-
English speaking defendants do not have their due process rights pre-
served at the same stage that English speaking defendants' rights are
protected.
Therefore, New York courts should follow the Mathews stan-
dard. This was applied in Garcia-Cepero and Molina, and provides a
better analytical framework than Rodriguez and Ramos, taking into
account the competing interests of the accused and the government.
It considers the unique circumstances of this type of criminal case
127 Compare Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 697-98 (following the Mathews test), and
Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 796 ("In following the United States Supreme Court's analys-
es . . . . "), with Burnet, 882 N.Y.S.2d at 843 ("The chemical test proceeding ... is neither
judicial nor criminal; it is administrative. Accordingly, there is no fundamental right to an
interpreter during a chemical test process."), and Ramos II, 258 N.E.2d at 198 ("[A] defen-
dant ... is entitled to have the trial testimony interpreted to him in a language which he un-
derstands.").
128 Cafeteria & Rest. Workers, 367 U.S. at 895 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
129 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
130 See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (2) (a) (1).
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because a videotape of the physical coordination test will provide ob-
jective evidence to assist both the prosecution and defense, and the
use of an interpreter will provide non-English speaking defendants
the choice of whether to proceed with the test.131 Without this evi-
dence, a defendant's right to a complete defense is limited, and poss-
ible exculpatory evidence is unavailable to a non-English speaking
defendant while an English-speaking defendant is entitled to that
same type of evidence.132
The distinction between Rodriguez and Ramos on the one
hand, and Matthew on the other begs the question-which standard is
more desirable for courts? Following Rodriguez and Ramos, non-
English speaking defendants will have their due process rights signif-
icantly burdened at the same stage that an English speaking defendant
will have them protected. If New York follows Mathews, it will pro-
vide more protection to defendants because their constitutional rights
trump the government's interest in roadway safety and protecting the
public against drunk drivers.'33
With three inconsistent decisions in over a year, it seems that
the courts will continue struggling to strike the balance between Ro-
driguez and Ramos on the one hand and Mathews on the other, be-
cause providing interpreters at extrajudicial proceedings will become
unduly burdensome for the government when trying to locate an in-
terpreter for every possible language that is spoken. At the same
time, future courts will have to be cautious and consider what is at
stake here-the concern for protecting the constitutional rights of a
criminal defendant that date back to the time when the framers
' Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 796-97.
132 See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). The Court stated that:
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, criminal
prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fair-
ness. We have long interpreted this standard of fairness to require that
criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense. To safeguard that right, the Court has developed
"what might loosely be called the area of constitutionally guaranteed
access to evidence." Taken together, this group of constitutional privi-
leges delivers exculpatory evidence into the hands of the accused, there-
by protecting the innocent from erroneous conviction and ensuring the
integrity of our criminal justice system.
Id. (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)).
... Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
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drafted the Constitution. Criminal defendants' equal protection and
due process rights should never come second to any governmental in-
terest. However, the question still stands-will all languages be
treated equally? How can the NYPD account for every type of lan-
guage they might encounter? Molina provides little guidance as the
holding is specifically limited to Spanish-speaking individuals. Un-
fortunately, it is likely that the courts will have to wait until the same
issue is presented by a defendant who speaks a different language and
who did not have the assistance of a translator. If it becomes a repeti-
tive issue for the courts, then the Legislature should consider legisla-
tion to remedy this issue.
The NYPD's inherently discriminatory procedure of not af-
fording a physical coordination test to non-English speaking defen-
dants completely disregards their constitutional rights. Until propo-
nents of Rodriguez and Ramos recognize that a case-by-case inquiry
is necessary to account for unique circumstances, the bright line rule
of only affording an interpreter at judicial proceedings will continue
to disadvantage non-English speaking individuals. Therefore, New
York should continue to adhere to Mathews because of its flexibility,
unlike Rodriguez and Ramos' rigid standard that discriminates
against non-English speaking defendants at the critical stage of a
DWI case-the first two hours.134
Brian Shupak
1' See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2) (a) (1).
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